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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAV-
INGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
a corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE ST. PAUL INSURANCE \ Case No. 
COMPANIES, ,· 10765 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE IN-
SURANCE AND TRUST COM-
P ANY, Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
AND TRUST COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This action seeks declaratory relief interpreting the 
policy of fidelity insurance of the defendant-appellant, 
1 
St. Paul Insurance Companies, declaring whether or 
not said insurance company is excused from its liabilitv 
under said policy by reason of the existence of a titie 
insurance policy issued by defendant-respondent, First 
American Title Insurance and Trust Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court declared that appellant's policy of 
insurance covered the fidelity loss described in the plead-
ings, and that appellant was not excused from liability 
by reason of the existence of a title insurance policy, and 
thereby entered summary judgment in favor of the 
insured, and dismissed the cause as to the title insurance 
company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent, First American Title 
Insurance & Trust Company, submits that the judg· 
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent will hereinafter be referred 
to as Prudential. Defendant-appellant will hereinafter 
be referred to as St. Paul, and defendant-respondent 
will hereinafter be referred to as First American. 
Without intending to be picayune, St. Paul's dis· 
organized statement of facts can only lead to confusion. 
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.1 
The facts herein are simple and without dispute, leaving 
only an issue of law, which the trial court properly 
resolved by summary judgment. The facts in a nutshell 
are: 
( 1) One Delmar D. Rowley, a long standing 
trusted loan officer of Prudential, embezzled substantial 
sums of money from Prudential (R. 2, 5). 
( 2) Rowley was charged, tried and convicted of 
four counts of "misapplication of funds by savings and 
loan association officer" including the misapplication 
of the funds entitled "The William Duane Parker Ac-
count" ( R. 40-44). 
(3) At the time of said embezzlements and mis-
applications, St. Paul had issued its blanket bond in-
denmifying Prudential against loss by reason of any 
dishonest or fraudulent act of any of Prudential's 






"The Underwriter agrees to indem-
nify the Insured: 
(a) To any amount not exceeding 
$1,000,000.00 from and against-
1. Any loss by reason of any dishon-
est, fraudulent or criminal act of any 
Employee, as heretofore defined, or 
of any director or trustee of the In-
sured while perf arming acts coming 
within the scope of the usual duties 
of an Employee, including loss of 
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property by reason of any such act 
of any such Employee, and also in-
cluding the dishonest issue of stock 
share or investment certificates h)'. 
any such Employee, whether acting 
alone or in collusion with others." 
(P. Ex. 1). 
( 4) Rowley embezzled the "Parker" account money 
from Prudential by pocketing the loan from Prudential 
to Parker when, in fact, his duty, obligation and trust 
was to pay the major portion of said loan to First 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, which held a prior 
first mortgage lien against the Parker property (R. 
1, 2, 5). 
( 5) After Rowley's embezzlement and misappli· 
cation of Prudential's money, but prior to the discovery 
of his criminal act, a policy of title insurance was issued 
by First American to Prudential insuring against the 
invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of Prudential's 
mortgage upon the Parker property (R. 3, 25). The 
preliminary title report issued prior to the completion 
of the Prudential loan showed the existence of, and 
excepted from the forthcoming policy, the First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association mortgage. The policy 
was issued, apparently in error, after Rowley's em· 
bezzlement, making no reference to the First Federal 
mortgage ( R. 3, 33-35) . The policy of title insurance 
contained the following exclusions from the coverage 
of the policy: 
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"3. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE 
COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY 
This policy does not insure against loss 
or damage by reason of the following: 
* * * * 
( d) Defects, lie.ns, encumbrances, ad-
verse claims against the title as insured or 
other matters (I) created, suffered, as-
sumed or agreed to by the insured claim-
ing loss of damage; or ( 2) known to the 
Insured Claimant at the date such In-
sured Claimant acquired an estate or in-
terest insured by this policy and not known 
to the Company or not shown by the pub-
lic records; or ( 3) resulting in no loss to 
the insured Claimant; or ( 4) attaching or 
created subsequent to the date hereof." 




"If the Insured holds other valid or 
collectible indemnity against any loss, 
covered hereunder, the Underwriter 
shall be liable hereunder only for such 
amount of such loss as is excess of 
the amount of such other indemnity, 
not exceeding the amount of cover-
age hereunder." (P. Ex. I). 
The exclusionary clause is the very heart of the matter 
before this court. 
(7) Prudential sought declaratory relief to deter-
mine if the exclusionary clause meant that St. Paul 
was not responsible because of the issuance of First 
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American's title policy. St. Paul, in its pleadings, 
memorandums, arguments, offers of proof and briefs 
on appeal asserts that its policy does not cover Rowley's 
embezzlement because of this clause and the existe~ce 
of the First American title policy. Anything else 
presented by St. Paul does not meet this issue, but 
clouds it. 
( 8) The trial court specifically found and declared 
that the title insurance policy did not constitute "other 
valid or collectible indemnity against any loss covered 
hereunder" (that is by the St. Paul fidelity bond). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECLARATORY DETERMINATION 
THAT THE TITLE POLICY DOES NOT CON· 
STITUTE AN EXCLUSION FROM THE COV-
ERAGE OF THE FIDELITY POLICY IS 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
A determination of the meaning of St. Paul's 
fidelity policy does not really require great mental · 
gymnastics or a resort to detailed legal precedent. St. 
Paul, for a premium, insured Prudential up to one 
million dollars with respect to dishonest, fraudulent and 
criminal acts of its employees, burglary and robbery, 
loss of customer's property, fraud, counterfeiting, 
forgery and unexplained disappearance of other 
property. The bond is a standard building and loan 
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association protection from losses resulting from dis-
honesty and chicanery. The bond in no way purports 
to cover such things as validity of title to property. As 
is standard in insurance contracts, whereby insurance 
companies seek to prevent the insured from recovering 
twice for the same loss, the fidelity bond provides that 
if Prudential has more than one fidelity policy, then the 
other fidelity policies must first respond. It cannot 
reasonably be claimed that the statement: 
"If the Insured holds other valid or collectible 
indemnity against any loss, covered hereunder, 
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only 
for such amount of such loss as is excess of the 
amount of such other indemnity, not exceeding 
the amount of coverage hereunder." (P. Ex. 1). 
was meant to insulate St. Paul from liability if Pru-
dential also held title insurance, or for that matter, fire 
insurance, earthquake insurance, automobile insurance, 
or public liability insurance. 
"Insurance policies usually provide against the 
existence or procuring of other or additional in-
surance upon the property insured without the 
consent of the insurer. Such a provision is de-
signed to check the fraud or carelessness result-
ing from over-insurance." 29A Am. Jur. 149, 
Insurance, §954. 
It is uniformly held that "other" insurance, as that 
term is used in exclusionary clauses of insurance policies, 
exists only where more than one policy of insurance 
coYers the same interest, in the same property against 
the same risk for the same person. There is "other" 
insurance only where the insured undertakes to msure 
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the same thing twice over against the same perils. 
29A Am. J ur. 153, Insurance, § 961. See Blue 
Anchor Overall Co., Inc., v. Pennsylvania Lumber. 
men's Mutual Ins. Co. (1956), 385 Pa. 394, 123 i 
A. 2d 413, 59 ALR 2d 546, wherein the defendant 
fire insurance policy covered fire loss and included 
coverage for loss from leakage from fire protection 
equipment and said policy contained a clause that the 
loss should be apportioned in the event the insured 
carried "other insurance whether concurrent or not." 
Other fire insurance policies carried by the insured 
contained no express coverage for leakage, and the court 
held that "other insurance" would exist only where two 
nr more policies covered the same interest, subject mat- 1 
ter and risk. 
The provisions of insurance contracts are to be 
construed in the sense in which they are ordinarily used, 
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Winget, 34 ALR 1 
2d 250, 197 F.2d 97, and unambiguous terms of an in· 
surance policy are to be taken in their plain, ordinary 
and popular sense. Abraham v. Insurance Company of 
North America, 29 ALR 2d 783, 117 Vt. 75, 84 A.2<l 
670. If there is ambiguity in the language of an insur· : 
ance policy, it shall be resolved in favor of the insured. 
Kavanagh v. The Maccabees, 242 Pac. 403, 66 Utah 
307; Colovos v. Home Life Insurance Co. of New York, 
28 P.2d 607, 83 Utah 401. 
St. Paul suggests that several obscure meanings 
were intended by the words, "If the insured holds other 
8 
valid or collectible indemnity against any loss covered 
hereunder, the underwriter shall be liable hereunder 
only for such amount of such loss as is excess of the 
amount of such other indemnity.", to wit: 
(I) That St. Paul's liability is excluded because 
the loss is within the more specific coverage of the title 
policy; 
(2) That St. Paul's coverage is excess only, and 
the title policy is a "no liability" coverage, and that, 
in this event, the no liability coverage must pay. 
It is most difficult, if not impossible, to read either 
of these meanings into the St. Paul exclusionary clause, 
and to do so would do violence to the construction 
standards, requiring the contract to be construed in its 
plain, ordinary meaning. In any event, we are faced 
with the following fallacies in St. Paul's reasoning: 
(I) With respect to the claimed doctrine of "spe-
cific and general insurance'', the cases all deal with a 
general insurer with an express provision in its policy 
that if either there is other more "specific" insurance 
or other insurance covering the same risk, that th~ 
general insurer will be considered only an excess insurer. 
See United States Guarantee Company v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co. (Wisc. S. Ct.)', 12 N.W.2d 59, 150 
ALR 632. See also Annotation 150 ALR 636. The 
St. Paul policy does not expressly ref er to other more 
''specific" insurance, but, of course, it does refer to 
other insurance covering the same risk (that is, "other 
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insurance against any loss covered hereunder") which 
brings us right back to the dilemma of St. Paul's 
position. The risks are not the same. In the case claimed 
by St. Paul in support of the claimed doctrine of general ' 
and specific clauses, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
Co. v. Cochran Oil, Mill & Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 
288, 105 S. E. 856, both policies therein covered personal 
injuries. The general policy provided that it would be 
considered excess coverage if another policy covering 
personal injuries from boiler explosions existed. The 
boiler policy provided that it would be considered excess 
coverage if other insurance existed covering the same 
risk. Not only were the two policies expressly involved • 
with the same risk, but the general policy expressly , 
referred to more specific insurance covering the same : 
risk, and in addition, the specific policy contained an 
excess clause, thereby confronting the court with a true 
apportionment problem-a far cry from the issue here .. 
(2) The second claimed interpretation of the St. 
Paul exclusionary clause, to wit: That there is a doc-
trine that between "no liability" policies and "excess" 
policies, the no liability policy must pay, is also not 
applicable. The claimed doctrine deals with a situation 1 
where two policies covering the same risk both contain 
clauses to avoid double insurance recovery, one of which 
is the excess clause (which we are faced with here l 
and the other is: "If there is other insurance covering 
the same risk, there shall be no liability on this policy." ' 
There is no such latter clause in the title policy in this 
suit. The title policy m no way attempts to guard 
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against double title insurance, nor does it seek to guard 
against other fidelity insurance. Obviously, the title 
policy covers a different risk and the classic concern of 
double insurance recoveries does not exist. Again, the 
claimed doctrine deals with true apportionment between 
liability insurers covering the same risk. See annotation 
46 ALR 2d 1163, beginning at page 1165. 
In summation, to prevent double recoveries, insur-
ance contracts often contain the following clauses: 
( 1 ) If there is more than one policy covering the 
same risk, the insurers shall hear the loss prorata or 
proportionately (no such clause here). See annotation 
21 ALR 2d 611. 
( 2) If there is more than one policy covering the 
same risk, the policy more specifically co~ering the same 
risk shall bear the loss (not the situation here) . See 
annotation 150 ALR 636 
( 3) If there is more than one policy covering the 
same risk, there shall be no liability with respect to the 
particular policy (no such provision in either policy 
herein). See annotation 46 ALR 2d 1163. 
( 4) If there is more than one policy covering the 
same risk, the particular policy shall be considered 
e.rcess insurance (not the situation herein). 29A Am . 
.Tur., Insurance, p. 794, §1715; annotation 46 ALR 
2d 1165; annotation 76 ALR 2d 502. 
Of course, a variety of judicial complications can 
arise with respect to apportioning liability when various 
combinations of the above escape clauses are presented. 
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29A Am. Jur., Insurance, p. 795, §1716. But we a~ 
here faced with a fidelity policy with an excess claust 
a title policy covering a different risk with no clam1 
to prevent doubling up of title recoveries, and insteao 
clear language that the policy does not insure against 
an adverse claim against the title created by the insureo 
itself. This is not an apportionment problem. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATORY JUDG· 
l\1IENT IS PREJVIATURE OR PROCEDURAL· 
LY FAULTY BECAUSE: 
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAS SUSTAINED A LOSS; 
B. MATERIAL ISSUES OFF ACT EXIST; 
AND 
C. THE COURT FAILED TO DETER 
MINE A SUPPOSED ISSUE OF ULTI· 
MATE LIABILITY BETWEEN THE IN· 
SURERS WHICH WOULD OCCUR BY 
REASON OF AN ALLEGED RIGHT OF 
SUBROGATION, 
ARE SPECIOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT. 
St. Paul's Points I, V, VI, and VII valiantly seek 
to prolong the final judgment herein by claims of pro· 
cedural error. St. Paul first claims that the judgment 
is faulty because there is no evidence that Prudential 
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sustained a loss. It will be recalled that the complaint 
seeking declaratory relief as to the construction of St. 
Paul's fidelity policy alleges that Rowley embezzled 
the money and that St. Paul's policy covers the em-
bezzlement, unless the exclusionary clause discussed 
above constitutes a valid escape hatch. This is all ad-
mitted by St. Paul's answer, and St. Paul also prays 
that the court declare it to have no liability by reason 
of the exclusionary clause (R. 5, 6). The issue of the 
amount or the extent of Prudential's loss is not before 
this court. St. Paul will have its day in court to ques-
tion, if need be, the amount of the loss. The only thing 
to be resolved by this proceeding is whether or not St. 
Paul's policy covers the fidelity loss in question - a 
completely proper procedure under our declaratory 
judgment statute, 78-31-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
giving the court the "power to declare rights, status and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed". 
Secondly, St. Paul claims that the trial court acted 
hastily because other necessary facts should be deter-
mined such as whether or not Prudential relied upon 
the title policy, whether or not Rowley was acting 
within the scope of his employment in pocketing Pru-
dential's money, etc. This is most immaterial to the 
prayer for declaratory relief, to wit: Does the escape 
clause let St. Paul out, in view of the title policy? 
Thirdly, St. Paul urges that the trial court should 
have resolved all matters once and for all including even 
the assumed situation whereby St. Paul pays off Pru-
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dential on its fidelity claim and then allegedly thereby 
stands in some position of subrogation against the titie 
company. None of these issues were before the District 
Court and any attempt by the District Court to litigate 
them prior to the happening of the events imagined 
would be improper. None of the parties sought such 
relief, and St. Paul's assertions in this regard cloud 
the real issue and seek to prolong the ultimate agony 
of the trial court's decision that the clause in St. Paul's 
policy seeking to mitgate against double insurance cover· 
ing the same risk has no application herein. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the district court should be affirmed. Appellant's policy 
clearly covers plaintiff-respondent's loss from embezzle· 
ment by its loan officer, and no other insurance existed 
enabling appellant to invoke the exclusionary clause 
in its policy. The issues were precisely and thoroughly 
presented to the trial court and the declaratory judg· 
ment rendered thereby is in accord with established 
law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEIN 
and DELBERT M. DRAPER, JR. 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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